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Essays
Institutional Choice for Software Safety Standards
BRYAN H. CHOI†
The pursuit of software safety standards has stalled. In response, commentators and policymakers
have looked increasingly to federal agencies to deliver new hope. Some place their faith in
existing agencies while others propose a new super agency to oversee software-specific issues.
This turn reflects both optimism in the agency model as well as pessimism in other institutions
such as the judiciary or private markets.
This Essay argues that the agency model is not a silver bullet. Applying a comparative
institutional choice lens, this Essay explains that the characteristic strengths of the agency
model—expertise, uniformity, and efficiency—offer less advantage than one might expect in the
software domain. Because software complexity exceeds the capacity of software expertise,
software experts have been unable to devise standards that meaningfully assure safety. That root
limitation is unlikely to change by amassing more software experts in a central agency.
This Essay argues further that the institutional choice literature should embrace an informationcentered approach, rather than a participation-centered approach, when confronting an area of
scientific impotence. While participation is a useful proxy when each stakeholder has relevant
information to contribute, it loses its efficacy when the complexity of the problem escapes the
ability of the participants. Instead, the focus should shift to constructing an empirical body of
knowledge regarding the norms and customary practices in the field.
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INTRODUCTION
Among those who believe better software standards are needed, there is a
growing schism as to who should be entrusted with developing such standards.
For decades, critics focused primarily on courts, urging them to enforce tougher
liability standards for software failures in order to promote greater discipline in
software development practices.1 Instead, courts exercised maximal restraint,
constructing a battery of doctrinal immunities that effectively shields software
developers from serious scrutiny of their coding practices. Despite intensifying
calls to unwind those bright-line rules, courts and legislatures alike have been
slow to change course.
The new wave touts regulation by federal agencies as a seemingly swift
shortcut to software liability reform.2 Frustrated by judicial inertia and
inexpertise, many commentators have pinned their hopes instead on agency
action. The move to expand agency oversight builds upon prior agency efforts
to review software quality in safety-critical domains such as avionics and
medical devices.3 Embracing this shift, the White House, under both political
parties, has issued strikingly similar orders tasking federal agencies with

1. See, e.g., Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTS.
TECH. & L. 1, 8–13 (1979); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time
Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 473 (2008) (arguing that software vendors should be held to a professional
malpractice standard); Frances E. Zollers, Andrew McMullin, Sandra N. Hurd & Peter Shears, No More Soft
Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUT.
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 781 (2005) (arguing that courts should apply strict liability to defective software because
courts “are in the best position . . . to continue to refine and develop the doctrine as changes in technology
occur”).
2. See RYAN CALO, BROOKINGS CTR. TECH. INNOVATION, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS
COMMISSION 3, 11 (2014) (arguing that a centralized agency is needed to avoid a piecemeal approach); Jane
Chong, The Challenge of Software Liability, LAWFARE (Apr. 6, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
challenge-software-liability (arguing that the regulation of software security should be delegated to an agency
like the Federal Trade Commission); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2271 (2015); Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software
When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1695 (2016) (worrying that software developers
(or coders) will become subject to regulatory turf wars across different agencies that result in a “regulatory
thicket” of inconsistent or contradictory rules); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83
(2017); ROB KNAKE, ADAM SHOSTACK & TARAH WHEELER, LEARNING FROM CYBER INCIDENTS 11–13 (2021)
(recommending the creation of a “cyber NTSB” to investigate cyber incidents).
3. See generally FAA, AC NO. 20-115D, ADVISORY CIRCULAR (2017) (authorizing the use of RTCA
Document DO-178 as a means to secure FAA approval of digital computer software in flight control systems);
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MEDICAL
DEVICES 8 (2005) (providing informal guidance that premarket submissions for software medical devices should
include documentation on design, implementation, testing, risk management, and traceability); FDA, PROPOSED
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) (2019) (proposing a reimagined approach to premarket
review for adaptive AI/ML technologies that continue to change and evolve over time); see also E. Stewart
Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of Medical Device Software, 52 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 511, 513 (1997) (describing efforts dating back to the 1980s).

1464

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:5

developing new technical standards to improve the safety and trustworthiness of
software systems.4
Yet, there is cause to doubt whether the agency model can meaningfully
improve software safety standards. Despite decades of intensive study, agency
regulation of software has remained so light-touch as to leave little mark at all.5
At least one agency has indicated that the traditional paradigm of premarket
safety regulation was not designed for continually evolving software systems.6
To be sure, that failure could be attributable to shortcomings of individual
agencies. Yet, if the regulatory failure is endemic across all agencies, then one
might ask whether the agency model itself has important limitations.
This Essay considers the question of institutional choice within the context
of software regulation. What lessons can the principles of institutional
competence teach us about the seemingly intractable problem of software
safety? Conversely, can a study of software complexity teach us anything new
about institutional choice theory?
Part II revisits the classic formulation of the tradeoffs between courts,
agencies, and other legal institutions, as articulated by the Legal Process
movement and its intellectual heirs. The standard narrative is that while courts
are a necessary backstop for upholding due process values, they are poorly suited
at guiding the design of complex technological systems. By contrast, agencies
are described as being nimbler than courts at leveraging expertise, advancing
uniformity, and acting with greater efficiency.
Part III contends that the comparative advantages of the agency model are
much diminished in the software domain. Due to the exceptional complexity of
modern software systems, a mere accumulation of software expertise is
insufficient to develop software standards that provide meaningful safety
4. See National Security Memorandum on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control
Systems (July 28, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/28/nationalsecurity-memorandum-on-improving-cybersecurity-for-critical-infrastructure-control-systems/ (ordering the
Department of Homeland Security, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and other
agencies to “develop and issue cybersecurity performance goals for critical infrastructure to further a common
understanding of . . . baseline security practices”); Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,
Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967, 3970 (Feb. 14, 2019) (ordering NIST to coordinate with other
agencies in “the development of technical standards and related tools in support of reliable, robust, and
trustworthy systems that use AI technologies”).
5. See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 192 (2014)
(describing the FDA’s approach to medical device software as “the archetype of regulatory minimalism”); see
also DEF. SCI. BD., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AD-A188 561, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE
ON MILITARY SOFTWARE 24, 32 (1987) (recommending that the Department of Defense (“DoD”) should retire
its military software standards, because DoD “cannot expect to lead in most aspects of software technology
development” and it cannot “create a de facto standard and impose it on the civilian market”).
6. See FDA, PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AI/ML, supra note 3, at 3 (“The traditional
paradigm of medical device regulation was not designed for adaptive AI/ML technologies.”); see also
Framework for Automated Driving System Safety, 85 Fed. Reg. 78058, 78059 (proposed Dec. 3, 2020) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (declaring that promulgation of safety standards for automated software systems
is “premature” because the development process is “complex and iterative”).

July 2022

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE FOR SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARDS

1465

assurances. Correspondingly, if centralized agencies are unable to provide good
software standards, then efficiency and uniformity become unwelcome traits,
and the distributed, incremental judicial model should be preferred.
Part IV zooms out and reexamines the participation-based theory of
institutional choice. A simple participation-maximization function has many
virtues, but it may not be best for regulatory problems like software safety where
best practices remain scientifically unknowable. Instead, as this Essay argues,
the institutional choice question should prioritize an information-generation
function. In particular, the adversarial judicial process plays a critical role in
forcing software experts to articulate and evolve their own understanding of
which software development practices are unacceptable.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE THEORY
In its modern incarnation, institutional choice theory posits that the choice
of institution matters in shaping how policy goals turn out. The normative claim
is that there ought to be a coherent theory that governs how such comparative
choices should be made.7
The insight that different institutions have different competencies harks
back to the Legal Process movement.8 The original impetus of that movement
was to shift discretionary power away from courts to other institutions having
better decision-making heuristics.9 Accordingly, much of the commentary on
judicial competency sounds in critique. Generalist courts are panned as “inept
for a modern society” that demands specialized study.10 And because unelected
7. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
POLITICS 7 (1994) (advocating a “participation-centered approach” to comparative institutional choice);
William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative
Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 416 (“Comparative
institutional analysis is normative: which institution, or cluster of institutions, will make the best rules, given the
criteria for successful rules in our society or legal system?”).
8. See Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (explaining that the “central principle [of
the legal process school] was that each governmental institution possesses a distinctive area of competence such
that specific tasks can be assigned to that institution without reference to the substantive policies involved”);
David Kennedy, Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 243,
247 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006) (“Regulatory agencies, [Hart and Sacks] suggest, are
particularly well suited for tasks requiring expertise, legislatures for those that require an ability to harness
diverse social interests to a general social purpose. Appellate courts are particularly suited for monitoring these
questions of institutional competence.”).
9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953,
958 (1994) (observing that Hart and Wechsler thought the courts ill-suited “to decide ‘polycentric’ disputes”
and “to develop policy”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (1994) (explaining Henry Hart’s views on the comparative advantages that
legislatures and agencies have vis-à-vis courts).
10. See James M. Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L.J. 519, 526, 537 (1938)
(“Such difficulties as have arisen have come because courts . . . assume to themselves expertness in matters of
industrial health, utility engineering, railroad management, even bread-baking.”); see also JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938) (“The administrative process is, in essence, our generation’s answer
AND
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judges lack direct accountability to electoral majorities, the power of courts to
dictate public policy is viewed as especially troubling.11 As a result, the
dominant stance of institutional choice theory—though by no means a universal
one—has been to urge courts to defer as much as possible to the judgment and
discretion of other institutions.
Challenging the competency of courts opened space for subsequent
scholars to explore the relative competencies of other institutions, including
agencies. Three of the more widely recognized advantages of agencies are
expertise, uniformity, and efficiency. Other reasons regularly cited in favor of
the agency model include political accountability and deliberative process—
although these latter factors are sharply contested by critiques rooted in agency
capture.12
First, agencies are most often lauded for their ability to cultivate subject
matter expertise in their respective domains, both because of their specialized
missions and because of their ability to hire specialized staff with relevant
training in the field.13 Agencies are considered especially good at engaging in
independent investigations and comprehensive fact-gathering when evaluating
complex issues of public policy. By contrast, judicial factfinding is limited by
the cases that are filed and the evidentiary records developed through the

to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes. It represents our effort to find an answer to those
inadequacies by some other method than merely increasing executive power.”).
11. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 1397–98 (“Most courts, and particularly the federal courts, are more
problematic because they are not directly subject to the electoral process or to the supervision of any elected
official, but only to words written in a statute, a group of previous decisions, or a constitution.”).
12. See generally Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political
Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–82 (2018) (identifying the four basic theoretical justifications for
judicial deference to agency decision making as (1) agency expertise, (2) deliberative process, (3) political
accountability, and (4) national uniformity). See also Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure,
and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1337 (2010) (explaining that “the stakeholders with relatively
greater resources are able to dominate the outcomes and often do so free of oversight by onlookers—not because
the deals have been struck through financial inducements, but because they are so technical and complicated that
in practice they take place at an altitude that is out of the range of vision of the full set of normally engaged and
affected parties”); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (2008) (observing that
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, nor are they accountable to a unitary executive model of
presidential control).
13. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 421–22 (explaining that agency expertise comes from specialization and
from including staff who have special training); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 258 (1988) (“Not only does the agency have a
staff of technical and professional experts to assist it, but it also deals on a day-to-day basis with the regulated
industry . . . .”); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1105 (2015) (expanding the concept of agency
expertise to include the “craft” expertise of “agency professionals”). But see Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1031, 1090 (1990) (pointing out that agency
expertise suffers problems such as selection bias and bounded rationality, which “raises too many doubts about
the wisdom of wholesale abdication to technocratic rule”).
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adversarial process.14 Governance by experts has its naysayers,15 but such doubts
tend to pale next to fears of blunders by judges and juries lacking even in expert
knowledge.16
Second, federal agencies are perceived to be better equipped to issue
uniform rules with national reach.17 Because agencies can study problems in a
comprehensive, top-down manner, they are better at assessing systemic effects
and avoiding inconsistent interpretations.18 Courts address issues in a trickle-up
fashion and are thus more likely to diverge across jurisdictions, even where there
is a single governing statute.19 While courts are capable of converging to a
uniform rule, such coordination is a relative rarity.
Third, agencies are usually characterized as being more efficient than
courts. Because agencies are able to operate in a command-and-control mode,
they can update policy directions on a speedier timeframe.20 In principle, that
14. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 413 (summarizing the critique that “judicial decision making is limited
by the structure of adjudication, the kinds of parties who will litigate, and the constrained resources and limited
personnel of the court system”).
15. See James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 367, 369–
74 (1976) (explaining American skepticism of administrative expertise).
16. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333–35 (1985); Peter Swire, Finding the Best of the Imperfect Alternatives for Privacy,
Health IT, and Cybersecurity, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 649, 667 (noting that courts are not a prominent alternative for
many issues of privacy, security, or health information technology because these problems “concern the design
of technologically complex systems,” whereas courts are more expert at resolving problems about “individual
redress for specific harms”). But see KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 138–40 (postulating that agencies might have
superior technical expertise, but that generalist judges and juries are “less subject to systematic influence and
bias”).
17. See Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 550
(2017) (explaining the prominence of the uniformity rationale within the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine, which
determines when courts should refer an issue to an administrative body for primary resolution); Barnett et al.,
supra note 12, at 1481 (noting that national uniformity has been invoked to justify Chevron deference to agency
interpretations).
18. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track
System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2174 (2000) (“Regulatory agencies are far better suited than lay judges and juries
deciding individual cases in isolation to assess systemic risk-risk tradeoffs and strike an appropriate balance
through decisions that take into account overall consequences for society as a whole.”).
19. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987) (stating that
national agencies “can be expected to reach single readings of the statutes for which they are responsible”
whereas judicial interpretations are “virtually assure[d]” to be diverse due to the Supreme Court’s limited
docket); Stewart, supra note 18, at 2169 (summarizing ALI study finding that “the tort system cannot ensure
desirable consistency and coordination in legal requirements, which is especially important for nationally
marketed products”).
20. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 419 (noting that “agencies have a variety of mechanisms that allow them
to generate national rules relatively quickly: administrative rulemaking, published guidances, handbooks, and
even online websites”); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1848, 1851 (2011) (recommending the
use of informal threats by agencies confronting conditions of “high uncertainty,” and observing that “[t]he
greatest advantage of a threat regime is its speed and flexibility”). To be sure, agencies can choose to engage in
a broad range of governance modes beyond command-and-control. See Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism:
Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357, 360–61 (noting the rise
of “new governance as a turn away from the kind of centralized command-and-control regulation favored by
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unilateral model also allows agencies to be more flexible in incorporating new
information based on changing developments.21 Agencies also have a range of
options in crafting regulatory schemes, including quasi-legislative rulemaking
and quasi-judicial adjudication, as well as executive functions such as informal
guidance and enforcement discretion.22 Meanwhile, the decentralized model of
common law courts requires policy changes to percolate across multiple venues,
which makes any such change unpredictable.23 Courts favor past precedent and
are limited to cases where they have standing, which can lead to path
dependency and delay.24 Adjudicative action also depends on access to courts,
which can be infeasible for certain constituencies.25 The judicial process itself
stands accused of being costly and wasteful.26 To be sure, many scholars have
pointed out that agencies also operate inefficiently at times, whether in relation
to private market forces or to public interest ideals.27 Nevertheless, the
prevailing wisdom has been that agencies are nimbler than courts at carrying out
policy agendas.28
In addition to studying static competencies, many commentators have cast
their attention on the dynamic interactions between courts and agencies. Among
those discussions, the vast majority has focused on the role of judicial review in
imposing accountability on agency administrators.29 Profound disagreement
liberal advocates of the New Deal welfare state, and as a turn toward informal, flexible, lay, and even extralegal
collaboration and problem solving”). But see Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechter-toChevron Spectrum: How the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically
Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 923, 964 (2020) (arguing that the Supreme Court is returning to a closer embrace of
the unitary executive theory).
21. See Byse, supra note 13, at 259 (noting that agencies are able to change their interpretations “in light
of new scientific, industrial, or other developments”).
22. See Cortez, supra note 5, at 206–17 (discussing different forms of agency action).
23. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650 (2001) (“Legal change is unpredictable ex ante and nonergotic,
and early outcomes may become locked in. . . . Opportunities for obtaining significant legal change are
limited.”).
24. See Huber, supra note 16, at 307–11 (criticizing the “go slow” judicial philosophy).
25. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 125, 128 (“Judges must await action brought by moving parties, often
private parties . . . . [T]he threshold costs of litigation, interacting with the distribution of stakes, can keep the
courts from a given social issue or from large sets of social issues.”).
26. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1140 (1996)
(identifying and responding to critics of the civil justice system who are “convinced that its cost is excessive”).
27. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 10 (1993) (identifying three persistent biases
of agency regulators: tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and inconsistency); Richard A. Posner, The Rise
and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 955–56 (1997) (identifying Naderite critiques on
the left and economic critiques on the right); Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets
Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 681 (identifying several inefficiencies in administrative process,
including the cost of organizing, the cost of information, and the cost of access).
28. See BREYER, supra note 27, at 57 (“In general courts are no more able—indeed they are less able than
Congress—to consider agency agendas as a whole and to set priorities.”).
29. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 428, 441 (stating that the “judiciary might be the best institution of all
to monitor certain kinds of agency dysfunctions, including those reflecting an agency’s ‘minoritarian bias’ in
favor of its specialized perspective or that of its client groups, as well as poor decisions flowing from an agency’s
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exists as to whether judicial review enhances or subverts agency
accountability.30 Either way, the field of play for these arguments assumes an
adversarial stance between the two institutions.31
The alternative stance is one of cooperative dialogue. For example,
Catherine Sharkey has argued that courts should harness the expertise of
agencies by embracing an “agency reference model” when determining optimal
regulatory policies.32 Chris Walker has cataloged a diverse set of tools that
courts could employ to enhance court-agency dialogue.33 In a complementary
vein, Doug Kysar has offered something akin to a “court reference model,” in
which he argues that agencies can learn from the adversarial posture of courts,
which forces parties confronting new technologies to articulate their unmet
grievances and to pioneer new remedies.34 Other scholars including Wendy
Wagner, Robert Rabin, and Richard Nagareda have centered the joint role that
courts and agencies can perform in generating information about risky products
and activities.35
‘majoritarian biases’ that impose unfair costs upon minorities”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense
Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, 5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP [i], 5
(2005) (“Public law—that is, administrative and constitutional law—mostly regulates regulators.”).
30. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FISHER & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPETENCE 70–74 (2020)
(collecting commentary); see also Neil Komesar & Wendy Wagner, The Administrative Process from the Bottom
Up: Reflections on the Role, if Any, for Judicial Review, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 891, 926 (2017) (arguing that
judicial review should be “reduced,” because it aggravates rather than alleviates the ability of minoritarian
interests to dominate agency processes, but remaining “reluctant to jettison” judicial review in its entirety).
31. See Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT
L. 1, 3, 37 (2006) (observing that “[t]he rivalry between tort law and the administrative state arises from an
increasing sense that the two regimes seek to do broadly similar things in broadly similar ways”).
32. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 449, 452–53, 477–79 (2008) (advancing an “agency reference model” for judicial decision making on
federal preemption questions, in which “courts should look to agencies to supply the empirical data necessary
to determine whether a uniform federal regulatory policy should exist”).
33. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue,
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1614 (2014); see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011) (identifying a dialogic relationship between courts and
agencies in cases involving serial litigation in administrative law).
34. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation Mechanism,
9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 54 (2018) (arguing that “common law tort actions can offer a decentralised and citizenempowering means of formulating and addressing regulatory goals.”); id. at 50 (stating that the benefits of tort
adjudication are “problem articulation, norm amplification, and intergovernmental signalling”); see also
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 112 (2005) (positing that an advantage of private enforcement suits
is that “[l]egal innovations pioneered by private plaintiffs, who may be more willing than conservative
government agencies to experiment with new approaches, may subsequently be adopted by the government
regulators themselves”).
35. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO.
L.J. 693, 695 (2007) (arguing that “the tort system plays an indispensable role in supplementing agency
regulation of risky products and activities” by being “more effective than the regulatory system in accessing the
various types of information needed to inform regulatory decisions”); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2061, 2068–70 (2000) (presenting the “information-generating mechanism” as
a complementary characteristic of both the tort system and the agency regulatory system); Nagareda, supra note
31, at 40 (arguing that federal preemption doctrine should “work in mutual support” of information eliciting and
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II. SHORTFALLS OF SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARDS
Proposals to delegate the development of software standards to the
administrative state invariably invoke these factors of expertise, uniformity, and
efficiency. For example, Paul Ohm and Blake Reid have suggested that the
federal government should “vest authority for code regulation in a single
government agency” in order “to stamp out, or at least recognize,
inconsistencies,” as well as to “bring[] together experts from industry,
government, the academy, and public interest groups.”36 Ryan Calo has argued
that establishing a new Federal Robotics Commission would avoid the pitfalls
of addressing robotics policy questions in a “piecemeal” fashion.37 This
overarching agency would “serve as a repository for expertise about a
transformative technology of our time.”38 Similarly, Andrew Tutt has proposed
the creation of a new “FDA for algorithms” on the grounds that a unified, federal
approach would aggregate expertise and avoid a “checkerboard” of state-bystate regulation.39 Jane Chong has argued that software security should be
delegated to a new agency akin to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
because “the complexities and uncertainties of the current, highly uneven
software risk landscape” demand “consistency and coherence of efforts” to
implement “industry standards and objective benchmarks.”40 Dan Solove and
Woody Hartzog agree that the FTC’s authority to regulate software is “sorely
needed” because it is the most practical way to “establish[] some baseline
standards and clos[e] gaps” in order to turn the U.S. data protection regime into
“something more coherent and comprehensive.41 Moreover, they add, the “FTC
is able to consider a more complete range of concerns than those addressed by
contract and tort law, and is thus able to achieve a balance that is more subtle
and comprehensive of everything at stake.”42
The centralized, top-down approach would be more compelling if the main
obstacle to better software safety standards were merely a lack of concerted
information updating purposes); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007) (arguing that FDA regulation should be understood as
a means of promoting investment in generating valuable information about the safety and efficacy of drugs).
36. See Ohm & Reid, supra note 2, at 1700.
37. CALO, supra note 2, at 3.
38. Id. at 6; see also id. at 11 (proposing that the Federal Robotics Commission should “consist of a handful
of engineers and others with backgrounds in mechanical and electrical engineering, computer science, and
human-computer interaction” as well as experts in law and policy).
39. See Tutt, supra note 2, at 113–14 (noting that “the most likely outcome of state-level regulation will
be a checkerboard of regulatory efforts”); id. at 117 (“A single national agency would be able to maximize the
centralized expertise that can be brought to bear on the issue while offering the most agility and flexibility in
responding to technological change and developing granular solutions.”).
40. See Chong, supra note 2.
41. See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 2, at 2271; see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC
and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 642, 661–62 (2014) (endorsing expanding uses
of the FTC’s unfairness authority to establish baseline standards in software design and data privacy practices).
42. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 2, at 2284.
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effort. But as I have explained elsewhere, the problem of software standards
exceeds the capacity of software expertise. The best available software standards
are surprisingly brittle, even in safety-critical domains such as military, avionics,
and medical devices.43 Moreover, I have argued that this failure is attributable
to the unprecedented complexity of software, which has made it all but
impossible for software experts to provide meaningful assurances of software
safety.44 This finding implies that the classical advantages of the agency model
have less purchase in the software context, and that centralized agency action
will fare no better than prior efforts to develop software safety standards.
The U.S. military was an early frontrunner in promulgating software
standards. Frustrated by problems of inconsistency and shoddy quality, the
Department of Defense issued a series of mandates stating that its software
developers should follow strict process controls in order to ensure that all
military software met the requirements specified upfront.45 These requirements
would cascade like a “waterfall” from the planning stage, to the design stage, to
the code implementation stage, and to the testing and integration stage.
Surprisingly this top-down approach—which was adapted from best practices in
other conventional engineering fields—proved unworkable in the software
context. The Department of Defense was advised that it should abdicate its role
in setting software standards and defer to the civilian market.46 The military
ultimately adopted this recommendation.47
Since the demise of the waterfall method, the dominant model of software
development has been the “iterative lifecycle” approach. Instead of attempting
to specify complete requirements upfront, software developers specify ad hoc
requirements with the expectation that those specifications will be updated and
patched in subsequent development cycles. This fragmentary approach is not
considered safe or reliable, but it has proved essential to avoiding process
paralysis and cost overruns. Software’s success has been tied intimately to this
iterative model, so much so that it is baked into every modern standard on
software quality.
For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) relies on the
DO-178 standard to certify software used in flight control systems.48 Early
43. See Bryan H. Choi, Software as a Profession, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 557, 573–74 (2020).
44. Id. at 570.
45. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD-STD-2167, MILITARY STANDARD: DEFENSE SYSTEM SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT 11 (1985). This standard was preceded by MIL-STD-1679, issued in 1978, and succeeded by
DOD-STD-2167A, issued in 1988, and MIL-STD-498, issued in 1994.
46. See DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 5, at 24, 32 (recommending that the Department of Defense (“DoD”)
should transition to civilian standards for software, because DoD “cannot expect to lead in most aspects of
software technology development”).
47. See Memorandum from William Perry, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Specifications & Standards – A New Way
of Doing Business (June 29, 1994), reprinted in INSIDE THE ARMY, July 4, 1994, at 15–17 (announcing policy
shift at the Department of Defense from military specifications to commercial standards).
48. See FAA, AC No. 20-115D, supra note 3.
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versions of this standard demanded strict waterfall design methods for the
riskiest components, but those guidelines were subsequently relaxed in order to
promote greater use of software in avionics systems.49 Since the 1992 revision,
the DO-178 standard has been flexible enough that “virtually any modern
methodology will suffice.”50 While the DO-178 standard provides some
meaningful safeguards against low-level implementation errors, it does not
provide substantive restrictions on how to plan or design software
specifications.51 In fact, to do so would clash with the iterative lifecycle model,
whose basic tenet is to maximize flexibility at the planning and design stages.
Likewise, the FDA’s guidance on medical device software assumes that
“[m]ost software development models will be iterative.”52 Unlike the FAA, the
FDA has not elected to adopt a single software standard; however, the leading
international standard for medical device software development is IEC 62304,
which the FDA recently endorsed as a “recognized consensus standard.”53 The
IEC 62304 standard closely resembles the DO-178 standard for avionics
software in key aspects. Most significantly, it too does not prescribe or proscribe
any specific software development model.54
The iterative lifecycle model owes its uneasy durability to software’s
“essential complexity.”55 That complexity far exceeds conventional notions of
human-designed complexity, because software is an arbitrary construct rather
than one constrained by physical materials or processes. As a result, software
errors do not obey a natural pattern, but emerge in an arbitrary manner that

49. See RADIO TECH. COMM’N FOR AERONAUTICS, DO-178C, SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS IN AIRBORNE
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION app. A (2011) (explaining that the 1992 DO-178B revision arose out
of a desire to incorporate “rapid advances in software technology”); J.P. Potocki de Montalk, Computer Software
in Civil Aircraft, 17 MICROPROCESSORS & MICROSYSTEMS 17, 21 (1993) (acknowledging that the 1985 DO178A standards are “extremely severe, and require the structure of the software to be simple and deterministic”).
50. VANCE HILDERMAN & TONY BAGHI, AVIONICS CERTIFICATION 54 (2011).
51. See RTCA, DO-178C, supra note 49, at 21–22 (“This document does not prescribe preferred software
life cycles and interactions between them. . . . The processes of a software life cycle may be iterative, that is,
entered and re-entered. The timing and degree of iteration varies due to the incremental development of system
functions, complexity, requirements development, hardware availability, feedback to previous processes, and
other attributes of the project.”); id. at 26 (“Other software life cycle processes may begin before completion of
the software planning process . . . .”).
52. See FDA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE VALIDATION; FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND
FDA STAFF 19 (2002); see also id. at 1 (declining to “recommend any specific life cycle model or any specific
technique or method”).
53. See
FDA,
RECOGNIZED
CONSENSUS
STANDARDS,
NO. 13-79
(Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfstandards/detail.cfm?standard__identification_no=38829
; see also INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N, IEC 62304: MEDICAL DEVICE SOFTWARE – SOFTWARE LIFE
CYCLE PROCESSES (2006), https://www.iso.org/standard/38421.html.
54. See Nadica Hrgarek, Certification and Regulatory Challenges in Medical Device Software
Development, 4 INT’L WORKSHOP ON SOFTWARE ENG’G IN HEALTH CARE 40, 42 (2012) (“CEI/IEC 62304 does
not prescribe a specific software development life cycle model to be used during development and maintenance
of medical device software.”).
55. See Choi, supra note 43, at 570–71 (citing Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., No Silver Bullet: Essence and
Accidents of Software Engineering, COMPUTER, Apr. 1987, at 10, 10).
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cannot be rigorously tested. Moreover, the scale of software complexity
typically grows much more immense than other engineering projects—and
unlike the complexities encountered in physical engineering, there is no way to
simplify software’s essential complexity. In fact, the ease with which such
complexity can be assembled is the double-edged advantage of software.
The lesson learned from software’s complexity is that available
engineering process controls cannot assure software quality for any nontrivial
system. Thus, the iterative lifecycle model reflects a pragmatic understanding
that process controls should be weakened in favor of quicker build-and-release
cycles, because adding more process controls fails to improve software systems.
Correspondingly, when software standards embrace the iterative lifecycle
model, it is an implicit concession that those standards offer no meaningful
assurances against software failure.
The iterative lifecycle model might be less troubling if there were easily
quantifiable performance measures that could simplify the assessment of
software safety.56 As a comparison, environmental safety is a complex,
polycentric problem, but one area of success has been pollution control, because
it is relatively straightforward to quantify usage and emissions of targeted
pollutants.57 Pharmaceutical safety is similarly complex, yet beneficial effects
and adverse effects can be tracked even when the biological mechanisms are
poorly understood. Traffic safety can be reduced to simplistic measurements
such as fatalities per hundred million vehicle miles traveled. For software safety,
such quantifiable performance measures have eluded discovery.58
When commentators invoke federal agencies as an ideal forum for
developing new software standards, they commonly invoke competencies such
as expertise, uniformity, and efficiency. But those values offer less salience here.
The pivotal problem is not one of inefficient coordination of expertise. As long
as software’s “essential complexity” necessitates an iterative lifecycle approach
to software development, a centralized regulatory approach will yield only the
same outcome that private bodies like RTCA, ISO, IEC, and IEEE have already
settled on. Contrary to the hope for a uniform approach, any standards that
56. See RTCA, DO-178C, supra note 49, at 12 (“Development of software to a software level does not
imply the assignment of a failure rate for that software. Thus, software reliability rates based on software levels
cannot be used by the system safety assessment process in the same way as hardware failure rates. . . . It is
important to realize that the likelihood that the software contains an error cannot be quantified in the same way
as for random hardware failures.”); id. at 89 (“Many methods of predicting software reliability based on
developmental metrics have been published . . . . This document does not provide guidance for those types of
methods, because at the time of writing, currently available methods did not provide results in which confidence
can be placed.”).
57. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 85, 88,
100–03 (praising technology-based standards in environmental law as “the first and best answer to pollution
control,” notwithstanding “considerable scientific uncertainty,” in part because the standards set “national
numerical requirements” that make compliance obligations “unparalleled” in predictability and ease of
enforcement).
58. See Choi, supra note 43, at 583.
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emerge will likely continue to delegate discretion to individual software
developers to plan and design software systems in ad hoc, iterative fashion.
III. THE INFORMATION-CENTERED APPROACH
What lessons could software teach institutional choice theory? One of the
more influential voices in the institutional choice literature is Neil Komesar’s
work on the “participation-centered approach.”59 The guiding principle of this
approach is that participation by important stakeholders should be maximized.
In weighing the comparative benefits and costs of choosing one institution over
another, Komesar argues, one must evaluate how different institutions empower
the relevant stakeholders to participate in the policymaking process.60
Institutions perform worse when they exclude interested parties, leading to
problems of minoritarian bias on one end, and problems of majoritarian bias at
the other extreme.61
Optimizing for participation is a useful proxy when each stakeholder has
relevant information to contribute to the issue at hand.62 When consensus is the
aim, for example, participation is essential to gathering information about
individual preferences. Likewise, if specialized expertise is required, then it is
useful to be able to assemble the best experts in the field.
The participation-based approach loses efficacy when some or all
participants are unable to provide dispositive information.63 In such scenarios,
an overemphasis on maximizing participation can distort the question of
institutional choice. Instead, the better heuristic is each institution’s capacity to
generate evidentiary information regarding the policy issue at hand.
This information-centered approach differs from the participation-centered
approach in at least two scenarios: first, when the inclusion of certain
stakeholders actively holds up the production of material information; and
second, when good-faith participation is insufficient of itself to generate the
information needed. Many commentators have explored the first concern that
regulated industries might seek to obscure or suppress internal information to

59. See KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 7.
60. Id. at 7–8, 272.
61. See Komesar & Wagner, supra note 30, at 901–07 (summarizing the two-force model of politics and
the twin problems of minoritarian bias (also known as capture theory, special interest theory, or interest group
theory) and majoritarian bias (“the tyranny of the majority”)); see also id. at 907 (arguing that minoritarian bias
is likely to be even worse in the administrative process than in the legislative process).
62. See Wagner, supra note 27, at 674–75 (explaining that “robust participation ensures that all groups
have access and a voice, which gives the forum legitimacy,” while also providing institutional decisionmakers
with “a more complete base of information from which to make decisions”).
63. Cf. Margot Kaminski, When the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 93 DENV. L.
REV. 925, 940–43 (2016) (offering a case study where collaborative governance failed to generate effective
results, and arguing that the reason goes beyond explanations grounded in barriers to participation).
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avoid regulatory costs.64 Less explored is the second scenario where the
complexity of the problem escapes the collective ability of the stakeholderparticipants.
For safety domains such as software, where the likelihood of bad outcomes
remains scientifically unknowable, I have advocated an adversarial, bottom-up
approach that asks experts to opine on individual cases of harm without seeking
to establish a single, uniform standard of care.65 By doing so, it induces software
experts to reveal, in an adversarial setting, actual norms and customary practices
within the software industry.66 Over time, that dialogue builds an empirical body
of knowledge as to which real-world practices are tolerated and which ones are
consistently condemned by the community of software developers.
A helpful example comes from the multidistrict litigation against Toyota
involving claims of unintended acceleration by its vehicles. A joint investigation
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and by NASA
had ruled out software-related causes, and had concluded that the unintended
acceleration events were caused primarily by mechanical errors such as “pedal
misapplication” or “pedal entrapment.”67 The ensuing litigation, however,
produced expert testimony that raised numerous red flags about Toyota’s
software development practices. The experts questioned why Toyota had failed
to record software failures or diagnostic codes that might be relevant to
replicating or testing the unintended acceleration issue.68 The experts also
criticized other practices such as extensive use of global variables, and the
decision not to follow coding standards used by other major auto
manufacturers.69 While the experts were unable to pinpoint a specific defect, the

64. See Wagner, supra note 35, at 707–08 (noting that regulated parties are “acutely aware of the costs that
could flow from divulging their internal information” and that they may seek to keep damaging information
secret or otherwise control information about the potential risks of their activities).
65. See id. at 614–15 (arguing that courts invoke the customary care standard when, inter alia, “bad
outcomes are mainly attributable to inherent uncertainties in the science of the profession”); cf. RTCA,
DO-178C, supra note 49, at 89 (declaring that “equivalent safety” for the software can be demonstrated through
a review of the software’s “product service history” to show the “types of problems occurring during the service
history period”).
66. See Choi, supra note 43, at 617–18 (positing that the customary care standard would generate
information on worst practices, as well as generate information on the range of practices in areas where there is
no established custom).
67. See NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRONIC THROTTLE
CONTROL (ETC) SYSTEMS 31 (2011) (“NHTSA believes that these incidents are very likely the result of pedal
misapplication” or “a stuck accelerator pedal”); id. at 60 (noting that “[e]xtensive software testing and analysis
was performed” and that “software defects that unilaterally cause a UA [unintended acceleration] were not
found”); see also Daniel Kaufmann, Capture by “Main Street”: Was the Car Safety Regulatory Agency Asleep
at the Wheel?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 11, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/capture-by-main-street-wasthe-car-safety-regulatory-agency-asleep-at-the-wheel/ (reporting concerns that NHTSA’s response was unduly
influenced by industry ties).
68. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1094, 1101 (C.D. Cal.
2013).
69. Id. at 1101.
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court found their testimony sufficient that a reasonable jury could infer a defect’s
existence, particularly “in light of the fact that [Toyota’s] software does nothing
to track its own failures.”70 Setting aside the specific result of this case, the
litigation produced a conscientious, independent code review with a reasoned
elaboration of which aspects of Toyota’s software development practices should
be found problematic.71 And although the experts in the Toyota case focused on
basic, low-level deficiencies, it provides a template for how experts in other
cases could elevate their review to higher-level elements.
Not all expert opinions are equally credible. In another case involving a
baby monitor device accused of failing to sound an alarm due to a software
defect, plaintiffs hired three experts to evaluate the device’s software source
code.72 The experts testified that the software consisted of “spaghetti code”—in
other words, that the code was so disorganized as to be indecipherable. Yet, one
expert “admitted that he never examined the code in any detail and only ‘spent
a half an hour just thumbing through it and looking at it.’”73 A second expert
testified that “it was not his job to look through the code for errors.”74 The third
expert purported to conduct a code review, but his conclusory statements showed
that he had simply assumed his conclusion.75 A more searching review of the
actual code and supporting documentation might have helped identify which
software development practices should be considered problematic and why.
This tilt toward courts rather than agencies might seem counterintuitive
from the participation-centered perspective, since access to courts may be
regarded as worse than access to agencies.76 Yet, in the software safety context,
the information-centered approach offers a different view. Where scientific
knowledge is at its muddiest, an agency’s ability to marshal subject matter
expertise provides little advantage in forging a regulatory path forward. Instead,
the judicial process can be more proficient than the administrative process at
70. Id. at 1102.
71. See Aaron Ezroj, Product Liability After Unintended Acceleration: How Automotive Litigation Has
Evolved, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 470, 514–15 (2014) (observing that the Toyota litigation “has shown
NHTSA’s limitations in effectively resolving automotive safety problems without the intervention of private
litigants,” and that “such an action can motivate the adoption of important safety improvements”); cf. Kysar,
supra note 34, at 50 (“Even when a plaintiff’s case fails on the merits, judicial engagement with the details of
her claim helps to frame her suffering as a legible subject of public attention and governance.”); Wagner, supra
note 35, at 714 (arguing that even the “worst cases” of regulatory litigation have information-production virtues
that outweigh their costs).
72. Graves v. CAS Med. Sys., 735 S.E.2d 650, 652–53 (S.C. 2012).
73. Id. at 654.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 654, 656–57 (finding that this expert “simply assumed the alarm did not sound and provided no
reason for discounting the evidence to the contrary other than the assertion of the person alleging a failure”).
76. That said, some commentators—including Neil Komesar—have invoked the participation-based model
to argue that access to courts is easier than access to agencies in some instances. See Wagner, supra note 35, at
697 (claiming that courts increase participation by lowering the costs of information); Komesar & Wagner, supra
note 30, at 925 (asserting that ex post product liability actions in courts are subject to “considerably less
minoritarian bias” than ex ante product safety regulations in agencies).
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generating an alternate type of information: evidentiary records from adversarial
proceedings.77
In environmental law, Doug Kysar offers the example of fruit growers
seeking to eliminate harmful emissions from a nearby aluminum facility during
the 1960s, prior to enactment of the Clean Air Act.78 Though the defendant
argued that the cost of preventing emissions would be prohibitively expensive,
plaintiffs developed an extensive evidentiary record showing that an alternative
approach to pollution control was feasible and effective.79 The generalized
problem of air pollution may have been daunting and scientifically uncertain,
but facing off against a specific factory with specific technologies impelled the
plaintiffs to articulate specific deficiencies with that factory’s approach.
Similarly, the common understanding among software experts is that the
cost of preventing software failures is prohibitively expensive.80 Consequently,
a remarkably vast array of software development practices has sprung into
existence and all are given the same legal acceptance. The adversarial process
could reveal where the true bounds of acceptability lie. Here, the heterogeneity
of the judicial process serves as an institutional advantage, not a disadvantage.
Where the science of the field offers no firm guidance, the search for safety
standards should tolerate a range of practices. The surest way to locate that range
is on an iterative, case-by-case, common law basis.
Agencies continue to play an important role under the information-centered
approach. As many commentators have observed, agencies and courts work in
dialogue to generate evidentiary information across many regulatory contexts.81
In the environmental context, the approach pioneered by the fruit growers’
litigation has become tightly embedded into the administrative work of the EPA.
Likewise, agencies such as FAA, FDA, and NHTSA will be able to incorporate
the lessons of software safety litigation. These agencies also perform their own
investigative and adjudicative functions, which can provide a parallel track for
generating evidentiary information. But unless those agency activities are

77. See Wagner, supra note 35, at 696–97 (arguing that tort litigation offers an alternate, efficient source
of information about product and activity risks).
78. See Kysar, supra note 34, at 58–59.
79. Id. at 62–63 (citing Renken v. Harvey Aluminum Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963)).
80. See Steven Fraser & Dennis Mancl, No Silver Bullet: Software Engineering Reloaded, IEEE
SOFTWARE, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 91, 91–92 (summarizing panel discussion that twenty years of progress in software
tools and methods has not solved the basic problem of software’s essential complexity).
81. See Wagner, supra note 35, at 696 (“Once the information needed to inform regulation is made
available through tort litigation, the work of the tort system is done. Regulators must then re-enter the process
and develop more sophisticated and streamlined approaches to product regulation . . . .”); see also Jane Chong,
Bad Code: Exploring Liability in Software Development, in CYBER INSECURITY 69, 77 (Richard M. Harrison &
Trey Herr eds., 2016) (agreeing that “[c]lassical command-and-control regulation is too restrictive and inflexible
to form a viable foundation for a software security regime,” but arguing that agencies have a variety of other
options to “influence vendor design and development choices without unduly restricting them,” such as selfcertification or public reporting requirements, independent audits, and rating systems).
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genuinely adversarial, they should be viewed as subsidiary to, not substitutive
of, the information-generating role of courts.82
Relying on courts to generate evidentiary information is not without its
own substantial risks. One important risk is that defendants will repeatedly
choose to settle rather than to litigate close cases. Settlement can avoid or
suppress the discovery process that is crucial to providing independent reviews
of software development practices.83 Second, even if a case undergoes the
discovery phase, defendants might misuse evidentiary rules to elude adversarial
review.84 A third risk is that courts will resolve software safety claims on
summary grounds, whether in favor of plaintiffs or defendants, thus obviating
the need for searching discovery.85 Thus, courts that are attentive to the
information-centered approach should pay close scrutiny to questions of how
information about software systems and software development practices is
obtained, reviewed, and released.
CONCLUSION
The impulse to propose a super-agency for software regulation stems from
optimism about the special competencies of administrative agencies, as well as
pessimism about other institutions, including courts and the private market. This
Essay seeks to moderate that exuberance by explaining that agencies offer few,
if any, comparative institutional advantages in the arena of software safety,
while courts offer more comparative advantages than usually supposed.
The conventional advantages of agencies include expertise, uniformity, and
efficiency. Yet, software experts have already labored extensively to try to

82. See generally Christopher J. Walker & Melissa Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 143–44, 144 n.9 (2019) (explaining that the vast majority of agency adjudications today
does not look like APA formal adjudication, and that agency adjudications vest final decision-making authority
in the agency head, which gives agency heads “almost unfettered authority to review and reverse their
adjudicatory boards, through which they set binding policies for the agency”). Cf. Rabin, supra note 35, at 2074
(“[N]o serious commentator would argue for a regulatory compliance defense in circumstances where the agency
regulations are regarded as minimum safety standards rather than optimal standards.”).
83. See Wagner, supra note 35, at 731 (stating that “the practice of sealing documents in the course of
settlements has the potential to undermine significantly the information-generating benefits of regulatory
litigation”).
84. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1371–77 (2018) (arguing that technology companies have overclaimed trade
secret status to avoid discovery requests); Rebecca Wexler, Privacy as Privilege: The Stored Communications
Act and Internet Evidence, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2721, 2782–83 (2021) (arguing that technology companies have
improperly exploited the Stored Communications Act to avoid the administrative burdens of complying with
subpoenas). But see Wagner, supra note 35, at 699–701 (stating that agencies are more likely than courts to
capitulate to regulated parties’ requests to classify critical information as trade secrets).
85. Compare Scott, supra note 1, at 450–57, 470–71 (describing summary dismissals of software tort
claims based on the economic loss doctrine and contractual preclusion), with Jonathan M. Hoffman, Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Indeterminate Product Defects: If They Speak for Themselves, What Are They Saying?, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 353, 382 (1995) (describing the allowance of circumstantial evidence to prove likelihood of product
defect).
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develop uniform standards that certify software quality. Because of software
complexity, those coordinated efforts have resulted only in half measures that
provide the thinnest veneer of safety assurance, even in the most safety-critical
domains. That prognosis indicates that the agency model will fare no better than
the industry self-regulation model.
Ordinarily, the institutional choice analysis might end there. But an
information-centered approach suggests that courts may have a latent
comparative advantage in domains such as software safety where the risks are
scientifically indeterminable. By generating evidentiary information about
specific software systems and software development practices in an adversarial
setting, courts can force the software community to confront the full range of
real-world practices and to opine on the bounds of acceptability. This bottomup wellspring of information can then be used by agencies or other regulators to
set a minimum floor of unacceptable practices, even if experts cannot agree on
what are good practices.
The information-centered approach depends on courts embracing a more
proactive role in adjudicating software liability cases, rather than abdicating to
the expertise of agency regulators or private industry. In that regard, I align
myself with those commentators who have called for deeper judicial engagement
in software tort cases. But unlike those commentators, I do not necessarily
believe deeper judicial engagement needs to correlate with higher liability rates.
The information-generation function is outcome-neutral and is served equally
well regardless whether liability attends.
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